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COMMENTS
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AS A
TOOL TO CURTAIL CONGLOMERATE
ACQUISITIONS OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
The growing number of insurance company mergers in recent years
has caused increasing concern both within and without the insurance
industry. In the years 1960-68 more than 282 mergers were consummated or approved;' and in 1968 there were announcements of
over 100 pending mergers between insurance companies and approximately 27 pending mergers between insurance companies and noninsurers. 2 The relatively moderate concentration in the insurance
industry' and the ease of entry4 therein reduce the competitive impact
1. Note, Insurance Mergers and the Clayton Act, 78 YAnn L.J. 1404, 1409 n.39
(1969), citing Reffkin, "Mergers"-Conglomerates Purchasing Insurance CompaniesInsurance Companies Purchasing Other Insurance Companies, May 26, 1969 (Address
before Annual Convention of New Jersey Association of Independent Insurance Agents)
15-17.
2. Id.
3. As is illustrated by the table below, the insurance industry appears to be moderately
concentrated. The largest life insurer in 1969, Prudential (Newark), had $27.7 billion in
assets while the life insurance industry had $188 billion of assets in 1968. Hence the largest
life insurer had well over 10 percent of life insurance assets. The top 10 life insurers had
MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION IN INSURANCE
Percentages of Assets and Sales Held by Top Five Companies (or Groups)
(condensed data)
Sales
Total Admitted Assets

1963
1960
1933

Active*
18.7S
17.43
13.95

Subsidiary* Mutual
8.61
6.13
7.60
5.79
5.52
6.46

Premiums Written
Active
16.50
15.08
12.31

Subsidiary Mutual
6.94
11.00
6.78
9.91
6.99
8.50

Premiums Earned
SubsidActive
16.72
14.92
12.32

lary
6.82
6.74
6.74

Mutual
11.09
9.91
8.61

* An active firm is one which, over most of the period examined, had an identifiable
corporate existence in the securities market; a subsidiary firm is a stock company not
traded in the securities market.
ARTHIUR D. LIn'E, INC., PRICES AND PRoITs IN THE PROPERTY AND LIABImnJY INSuRANCE
INDUSTRY 27 (Summary Report, Nov. 1967).
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of mergers between insurance companies. Mergers of insurance companies with non-insurance companies, however, create a variety of
problems that call for legal redress. This comment examines this
second type of merger, and analyzes the possible application of Section
7 of the Clayton Act.5
I. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INSURANCE MERGERS
Insurance companies are a major factor in the credit market. In
1968 life insurance companies had admitted assets6 of over $188 billion, of which approximately $174 billion was invested in stocks,
bonds, and secured and unsecured loans.7 Those same companies
acquired $48 billion of new investments during that year.8 The property/liability insurance companies had approximately $51.2 billion in
assets.9 The tremendous aggregation of assets held by insurance
companies means that any merger trend will have important economic
consequences.' 0

69 percent of the assets held by the top fifty, and had approximately 61 percent of total
1968 life insurance assets. The 50 Largest Life Insurance Companies, FORTUNE, May,
1970, at 206-07; see also INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 66
(1969 ed.) [hereinafter cited as LE INSURANCE FACT BOOK]. In the property/liability
field the largest insurer had 5.8 percent of the underwriting market and the largest 10
had around 38.7 percent of the market. 70 BEST'S REVIEW PROPERTY/LIAB]LITY INSURANCE EDITION, June, 1969, at 10.
4. LiPE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 102 (1969 ed.). The number of life
insurance companies doing business in the United States has steadily increased. For
example, between 1960 and 1968 the number of companies increased from 1,441 to
1,775.
5. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
6. The treatment of discounts and premiums on certain types of bonds and of fluctuations in market value of owned securities results in a reported asset figure for insurance companies which differs somewhat from book value. For an explanation of the
approved accounting procedures in this area, see, e.g., E. IARAN, LFE INSURANCE
RECORDXEEPING AND ACCOUNTING 143-54, 186 (1960).
7. LIn INSURANCE FACT BooK, supra note 3, at 65-68 (1969 ed.). Life Insurance
companies alone supplied about 8 percent of the financial capital flowing from all investment sources. According to FORTUNE, May, 1970, at 204-07, the 50 largest life insurance
companies had admitted assets of $164.6 billion while the 50 largest commercial banks
had admitted assets of $249.4 billion.
8.
9.

LIF INSURANCE FACT BooK, supra note 3, at 66.
BEST'S AcGREGATES & AVERAGES PROPERTY-LIABILITY 1 (1969).

10. Leading insurance companies have immense amounts of assets, even when compared to large manufacturing corporations. For example in 1968 Fortune's 500 largest
industrials had total admitted assets of $361.1 billion. The 500 Largest Induistrial Corporations, FORTUNE, May, 1969, at 166-84. The combined admitted assets of life and
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In the manufacturing sector of the economy, there has been a substantial merger trend."
property/liability insurers were $239.2 billion. LiTE INsuR=CE FACT Boom, supra note
3, at 66, and BEsTes AGGREGATES & AvERAGES PROPERTY-LzmIar= 1 (1969). During
1968 new manufacturing and mining investment was $27.86 billion (Table I, note 11,
infra), while the life insurance companies alone made new investments of $48 billion.
Li INsuR1cE FACT Boom, supra, at 65.
11. The significance of the anti-competitive consequences of insurance company
mergers with non-insurers can only be fully appreciated in the context of increasing
industrial concentration in the United States. In 1968 the 200 largest manufacturing
corporations owned 60.9 percent of manufacturing assets and received 62.9 percent of
manufacturing profits, as indicated by Table I. This represents a 13.7 percent increase
in assets and a 16.9 percent increase in profits over 1947 levels. Table I indicates a
pronounced trend towards concentration. The force that mergers have had in this trend
can be seen from Table II. In the years 1967 and 1968, mergers took a giant leap in
importance as a method of increasing corporate assets. In conjunction with this rash of
merger activity there was a rather large jump in the percentage of assets owned by the
200 largest manufacturing corporations. For the years 1966-68 this percentage moved
from 56.7 to 60.9 percent-an increase of over 4 percent. One is forced to conclude that
the 200 largest manufacturing corporations are rapidly increasing in power.
TABLE I
200 LARGEST MAI(uPACTuRING CoPoPATIoNs' SHARE OP MANUFACTURNG
ASSETS, AND MAzUFACTuRING VALUE ADDED In VARIOUS YEARS

[Figures below represent percentages of total]

Year

Corporate
Manufacturing
Assets

Corporate
Manufacturing
Profits

Corporate
Manufacturing
& Mining Assets

Total Value
Added by
Mfrs.

1947

47.2

41.7

44.2

30

1954
1958

52.1
56.6

63.3
64.1

48.8
53.0

37'
38

1963
1966
1968

56.3
56.7
60.9

65.1
58.6
62.9

53.2
54.2
58.6

41
42
NA.

9.5
13.7

16.9
21.2

10.0
14.4

12
NAL

Percentage pt. change
1947-66
1947-68
Percentage Change

1947-66

20.1%

40.5X

22.6%

40%

1947-68

29.0%

50.8%

32.6%

N.

Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, in Hearings on S.
Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8A, at 176 (1969).
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For perhaps similar reasons, the insurance industry has likewise
11.

(cont.)
TABLE II
ACQ

ED ASSETS COtmpARFD WITH NEW INVESTNMNT IN
MANUFACTURING

New Investment

AND MINING,

1948-1968

Total Acquired Assets

(Billions of Dollars)

Year
1948

10.01

.156

1949

7.94

.103

1950

8.20

.262

1951

11.78

.288

1952

12.61

.452

1953

12.90

.953

1954

12.02

1.782

1955

12A0

2.825

1956

16.19

2.777

1957

17.20

1.963

1958

12.37

1.435

1959

13.06

2.642

1960

15.47

2.326

1961

14.66

2.630

1962

15.76

2.990

1963

16.73

3.947

1964

19.77

3.670

1965

23.75

4.914

1966

28.46

5.416

1967

28.11

10.815

1968

27.86

15.200

Id. at 668.

500

Acquired Assets
as a Percent of
New Investment

Insurance Mergers
experienced an accelerating trend toward mergers.12 For example, in
1968, the latest year for which figures are reported, acquired property/liability companies had admitted assets of $4.8 billion;" thus
mergers were consolidating nearly 10 percent of the property/liability
assets annually.14 By comparison, property/liability companies acquired in 1960 had assets of only $117 million. 15 Even if the same percentage figures do not hold true for the larger life insurance segment

12.
NUBER AD VALuE OF ADMITTED AssETs OF ACQUJRED PROPERTY
AND LIAI= ComPANmS, 1960-68

Value of
Admitted Assets
Stock 2

Number of Companiesl
Year

Mutual

Stock

Total

(Millions)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

27
14
35
34
27
15
15
21
11

26
42
35
52
57
35
42
38
54

53
56
70
86
84
50
57
59
65

117
497
541
1,015
826
185
740
1,245
4,795

199

381

580

9,961

Total

1 Acquisitions reported include only those acquisitions where a change in ownership occurred. Therefore, the table does not reflect mergers and acquisitions where
there was a prior ownership affiliation between the companies and the merger would
reflect only a corporate reorganization.
2 Value of admitted assets are for stock companies only and includes companies
of all sizes. Assets for mutual companies were not reported due to unavailability of
asset data. Most mutual companies acquired were relatively small compared to stock
companies acquired, as measured by admitted assets.
DIVISION or INDusTRY ANALYsis, BUREAu OF EcoNoMIcs, FTC, REPORT TO THE DEP'T or
TRANSPORTATioN ON STRucTURAL TaE=s AND CoNnmIoNs n THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AUTOmOBIE INsURANcE INDUSTRY REPORT].

13. Id. at 37.
14. During 1968 property/liability companies bad assets of $51.2 billion while the
assets of acquired property/liability insurers were $4.8 billion, or 9.4 percent of admitted assets. See text accompanying notes 9 and 13, supra. It should be noted, however,
that the 1968 acquired assets figures include the International Telephone & Telegraph
Company's acquisition of Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and therefore are abnormally high.
15. See note 12, supra.
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of the insurance industry, it is clear that insurance mergers involve
a substantial amount of assets.
Moreover, since 1960 mergers involving insurance companies have
shown an increasing tendency to be conglomerate; 16 in 1968 and 1969
59.1 and 75 percent, respectively,17 of all mergers involving larger

16. Mergers can be classified according to the markets in which the involved firms
deal. Mergers of competitors are termed horizontal, mergers of firms with buyer-seller
relationships are termed vertical, and all others are termed conglomerate. A fourth
category, carved out of the above conglomerate definition and encompassing mergers of
firms which deal in related product markets, is useful. Such mergers are termed product
extension mergers. Because of the diversified activities of modem corporations, any
given merger may present aspects which fall in two or more of the above categories.
The term conglomerate insurance merger, as used herein, refers to the merger of an
insurance company with another company which is neither an insurer nor a financial
corporation. Mergers of insurance companies with the latter are excluded from the term
because of the horizontal implications which inhere in merging the insurer's credit
operations with those of another financial corporation.
17.
NumER OF LARGE AcQumE AuTo INsuRERs, BY TYE
or AcQuisIroTN, 1960-691
Type of Acquisition 2
Conglomerate
Market
extension

Line
extension

Others
conglomerate

Year

Total

Horizontal

1960
1961

5
6

3

2

6

-

1962
1963

5

2

3

-

10

8

-

-

2

5
4
7

5
1

1

1

1965
1966

12
5
8

-

1

1967

12

4

-

2

6

1968
19693

22
4

6
1

-

3

-

-

13
3

Totals

89

46

10

25

100.0

60.0
100.0

-

-

Number

1964

1960
1961

502

100.0

-

-

8
Percent
40.0
-

-

-

-

Insurance Mergers
property/liability insurers were conglomerate."8 In 1960, there were
only two conglomerate mergers recorded for the same group of insurers, and in 1961 there were none.' 9 The amount of assets involved
in conglomerate acquisitions is not known, but there is little reason to
believe that for 196820 it was less than $2.8 billion (59.1% of
$4.8 billion). 2 Again, even if these percentages prove lower for conglomerate life insurance mergers and conglomerate mutual property/
liability mergers, these mergers clearly involve a substantial amount
of assets.

17.

(cont.)

1962

100.0

40.0

-

60.0

-

1963

100.0

80.0

-

1964

100.0

41.7

41.7

8.3

8.3

1965

100.0

80.0

20.0

-

-

-

1966

100.0

87,5

-

12.5

1967
1968

33.3
27.3

-

16.7
13.6

19694

100.0
100.0
100.0

25.0

-

Totals

100.0

51.7

9.0

-

-

11.2

20.0

-

50.0
59.1
75.0

28.1

' Acquisitions included in this table were derived from Appendix tables 8 and 9.
2 No vertical acquisitions were recorded. There have been a few instances where
insurance carriers have acquired insurance agencies (retailers) and vice versa, but
these have been smaller acquisitions.
3 The "other conglomerate" classification approximates what was classified as conglomerate in note 16.
4 First nine months acquisitions.
Auromo I E INSURANCE IxDuSTRY REPoRT, supra note 12, at 40.
While the table is limited to acquired auto insurers, it should be noted that virtually
all large property/liability insurers engage in underwriting auto insurance. In 1967
property/liability insurers had admitted assets of $46.6 billion. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INc.,
RATES oF RETuRN 3N THE PRoPERTY AN Lmnirrv INSURANCE INDUSTRY: 1955-1967, at
10 (1969). Admitted assets of companies engaging in auto underwriting were $47.6
billion. AUTOMOBI E INSURANCE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 14.
18. See note 17, supra. Furthermore, it should be noted that the conglomerate columns
of the table in note 17 exclude acquisitions by all types of insurance companies, but indude acquisitions by non-insurance financial corporations. The analysis in this paper
is primarily directed at acquisitions by non-financial corporations, so it should be remembered that the percentage of property/liability companies acquired by nonfinancial
corporations is somewhat less than that indicated in note 17. However, an examination
of all conglomerate insurance mergers since 1960 involving insurance companies with
over $10 million in admitted assets reveals that most of the acquiring firms were not
financial corporations. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 105.
19. See note 17, supra.

20. 1968 was the last year for which statistics on acquired assets are available.
21. See text accompanying note 13, supra.
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The strength of the conglomerate trend poses threats to the competitive climate in numerous markets, since the availability of a ready
source of credit through an acquired insurance company, when combined with the trend toward concentration in the manufacturing sector,
suggests an increasing competitive advantage for the largest industrial
corporations.
This advantage arises from the structure of the capital market;
corporations have three major sources of capital from which they can
expand their operations and provide themselves with working capital:
1) retained earnings, 2) borrowed capital, and 3) equity capital.2
The greatest proportion of improvements is financed out of retained
earnings; the corporation simply reinvests its earnings.2 3 Often, however, earnings will be insufficient to meet the firm's capital requirements, and in that event the firm is normally forced to seek money
on the capital market or to float a new issue of stock. For a number of
reasons many firms may prefer to go to the capital market; 24 but if
credit is tight and interest rates are high, as in the past several years,
corporations may experience difficulty acquiring needed capital on
acceptable terms. In this situation, having an insurance company as
a subsidiary or an affiliate becomes extremely advantageous.
Several anti-competitive effects arising from the advantage of this
credit availability can be isolated. First, competitors of the insurance
company's parent and affiliates might find themselves unable to match
the amount of money the latter pours into new production techniques,
expansion of capacity, or marketing. It is impossible to predict the
precise consequences of a merger without knowing in which markets
the parents and affiliates operate and the number, size and health of
the competitors in each of those markets. The tendency, however,
would probably be for small and medium sized firms in the affected
markets to be diminished as a competitive force, with the larger firms
which had merged with insurance companies becoming more dominant.
Second, conglomerate insurance mergers create the opportunity for
two distinct types of reciprocal buying and selling patterns. The pur22.

See Changes in Corporate Financing Patterns, 55 FED. REs. BuLL. 913 (1969).

23.
24.

Id. See also R. Jon sON, FNANCIAL, MANAGEMENT 360 (2d ed. 1962).
See generally R. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 500-47.
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chasing power of parents and affiliates might be used to increase the
sales of insurance, i.e., purchases of parents and affiliates might be
conditioned upon the suppliers' obtaining insurance coverage from
the acquired insurance company, thereby reducing competition in the
insurance market. Alternatively, the acquired insurance company's
loans might be conditioned upon purchases from the parent and affiliates. Since credit will normally be in short supply, at least for many
types of loans, the insurance company might well have the power to
force selected debtors to purchase from the parent, reducing competition in the parent's and affiliates' markets.
The third major objection to mergers of insurance companies with
non-insurers focuses on the credit market's function in the economic
process of allocating resources.2 5 In a capitalistic economy capital
theoretically flows to investments which have the highest anticipated
rate of return. The market for any goods produced reflects consumers'
desires for that particular good as opposed to all other goods, and the
price set by that market will be relatively high in relation to cost if
there is a shortage. Consequently, the rate of return for producers in
that market will be above the average; additional capital will be
sought for investment in that market; and those producers will be
willing to pay a higher interest rate for capital than most other producers. The interest rate actually paid will depend upon a resolution of
the demand and supply for money, but each investor will have some
idea of the rate of return expected from a venture and depending upon
that rate will be willing to pay varying amounts of interest. The supply
of capital depends, in turn, on how much people are willing to save,
rather than consume. The resolution of these forces determines first,
the interest rate, second, the amount of capital available for investment, and third, the recipient of that capital. If the system works
properly, it will allocate the total capital set aside by the economy to
those pursuits which the consumer values most simply by providing
capital to those willing to pay the highest interest rates. Industries
which have low anticipated rates of return, indicating low consumer

25. See, e.g., M. BRENNAN, T EORY or EcoNoanc STATICS 10-19, 442-60 (Ist ed. 1965)
for a simplified explanation of the resource allocation problem. Chapter 28 gives a de-

tailed explanation of the operation of the credit market. See also Schumpter, The Nature
and Necessity of a Price System in 2 READINGs IN EcONONIc Ax ,YsIs (R. Clemens ed.
1950); T. DERNBuRG & D. McDOUGALL, MACROECONOMivCS Chs. 8-10 (1963).
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preference for additional products, are cut-off from capital, and no
expansion of supply is made. Ventures which promise a high rate of
return, on the other hand, are assured capital and the economy in turn
is assured physical capacity in those industries where it is desired.
In practice the above process is quite complex, yet most economists
agree that within certain limits, which allow for imperfection in the
system, capital is in fact allocated in such a manner in our economy. 26

If the process is to continue to function, a free credit market is
essential. A major imperfection has developed in our credit market,
however. As previously mentioned, many corporations reinvest a substantial portion of their earnings. 2' These funds usually do not reach
the credit market and, to the extent other goals qualify the goal of
maximizing profits 28 and the considerations mentioned below come

into play, there is no assurance that they will in fact be invested in
ventures which are economically desirable; the funds might be used
for purposes which have such a low rate of return as to be denied funds
on the credit market. In this context, a trend towards mergers of insurance companies with non-insurance corporations can be seen as a
serious deterioration of the credit market since there is a strong
possibility some of the loans will be handled in a manner similar to
retained earnings.
The above projections of anti-competitive effects rest upon the premise that an acquired insurance company will not always choose
equitably among all possible investment opportunities and select the
combination of risk and rate of return which maximize its profit.
Rather, since the insurance company is controlled by the parent, the
insurance company will be utilized to maximize the profits of the entire
corporate entity, composed of itself, the parent, and any other affiliates, even at the expense of decreasing the insurer's separate profits.
26.

See, e.g., L. REYNOLDS, EcoNowacs 291-93

(Rev. ed. 1966); M. BRENNAN, supra

note 25, at 17-19, 404-19 (1965).
27. See note 22 and accompanying text, supra.
28. In today's corporate world, ownership is most often divorced from control. Although most corporate officials hold modest amounts of their employer's stock, the
personal financial advantage of maximizing corporate profits is remote. Undoubtedly
officers feel obligated to maximize the stockholders' profits, but there are competing
considerations, such as an amicable working relationship with employees, competitors,
and the government. To the extent that considerations inconsistent with maximizing
profits are deemed important, corporate officers may at times feel compelled to pursue
courses inconsistent with maximizing profits. See J. GALBPauTH, Ta NEW INDusTPIAL
STATE 120-38 (1967).
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This objective may result in preferences of the parent and affiliate
in loans, since by using the insurance company's capital to finance the
parent's and affiliates' operations the corporate entity is assured of
receiving the entrepreneurial profit which may be lost if loans are made
to firms outside the corporate entity. For example, assume that an
acquired insurance company can loan the money to several borrowers
at 8 percent and that its cost of capital is 4 percent. Assume further
that all of the borrowers are in the same risk class and that one of
them is an affiliate which is reliably projecting a rate of return of 12 percent on the proposed investment. If the loan is made to the affiliate the
corporate entity can expect a profit of 8 percent on the money invested: Similarly, if the loan is made to a non-affiliate, and if the
affiliate can receive a loan at 8 percent, the corporate entity will again
make a profit of 8 percent on the proposed investment. If the affiliate
cannot obtain credit from another source, however, the entrepreneurial
profit would be forfeited and the corporate entity's rate of return on the
invested money would be only 4 percent. Consequently, one should
expect the insurance company to most often prefer its parents and
affiliates during periods when money is tight, or alternatively, on types
of loans that appear to be relatively high risks and for which financing
is not readily available from other sources.2 9
Emphasis on the profits of the corporate entity may also result in
loans to customers of the parent and affiliates on terms less profitable
to the insurance company than alternative investment opportunities,
but with the understanding that the loan is conditioned on purchases
from the parent and/or affiliates.
It is not suggested that the acquired insurance company will prefer
its parent or affiliates in a high percentage of loans. Most loans will
probably be made on the same basis as before the merger, since the
parent or affiliate is not always an alternative source of investment;
and where money is available from alternative sources on acceptable
terms, it can be expected that parents and affiliates will, in many cases,

29.

Preferences might also result where an affiliate desires ambitiously to expand with

an eye towards dominating its market and obtaining oligopoly profits. It is possible
that the extensive financing necessary for such a venture might not be available from
alternative sources either because of a high risk factor or because of a lack of sympathy
for the expressed goal. In that case there would be an obvious and anti-competitive
advantage in having the financial resources of the insurance company at its disposal.
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take advantage of these sources. The above analysis does indicate,
however, that when credit is not readily available to parents, affiliates,
and their similarly situated competitors, the parent and affiliates will
turn to the insurance company. These are the precise conditions under
which such use of the acquired insurance company's funds will have
anti-competitive effects.
II.

THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

Before discussing the antitrust consequences of conglomerate insurance mergers it is necessary to determine whether such mergers are
even potentially subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, since the
McCarran-Ferguson Act grants the insurance industry a rather broad
exemption from federal antitrust laws.
Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 3" provides in part that:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a
fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after
June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act,
and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,

shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law.
The Act was prompted by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Association,31 which held that a multi-state insurance company
was engaging in interstate commerce and violated the Sherman Act by
conspiring with other insurers to set premium rates. Congress reacted
immediately with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, apparently feeling that
the entire framework of traditional state regulation of insurance would
otherwise be impaired, especially with regard to the sort of rate making
activities condemned in the South-Eastern Underwriters decision. 2
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).
31. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
32. For a discussion of the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see
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While the scope of the Act's exception from federal anti-trust laws
has been the subject of much controversy,33 at present the case law is
sufficiently well-developed to give a definitive answer on its applicability to conglomerate insurance mergers. Under the Act two things
must appear before the exception arises. First, the activities which
constitute the subject of the alleged anti-trust violation must be subject to "state regulation." Second, it must appear that the activities
are within the "business of insurance." The requirements which must
be met for each condition will be discussed separately.
A. Existence of State Regulation
The first and most fundamental requirement for "state regulation"
is the existence of a state statute governing the matter in question.
As of 1966 only 19 states had laws which regulated insurance mergers
prohibited by the Clayton Act.3" However, many states have recently
been quite active in considering legislation to deal with anti-competitive insurance mergers so that, at the present time, that figure may
be significantly larger. A great deal of attention has also been given
to aspects of the conglomerate merger problem other than competition.35 The legislation concerning this problem, which is couched in
holding company provisions, shows a great deal of diversity. A New
York special committee on insurance holding companies sent questionnaires to all 50 states regarding their provisions governing holding
companies, and received replies from 35 states.30 By far the most common scheme of state regulation consists of various examinations,
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458-61 (1969), discussed in notes 51-58 and
accompanying text, infra.
33. See, e.g., Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the Insurance Industry,
46 MIN. L. REv. 1088 (1962); SUBcomm. or Tnx PUBLIC REGULATION or BusINrss oF
INSURANCE Comm3., ABA SEC. OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW,
MERGER OF INSURANCE CoMPANIES 71 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ABA INSURANCE
MERGER STUDY]; Stem, The McCarran Act, 20 Years After, 1966 INS. LJ. 605 (1966);

Note, Insurance Mergers and the Clayton Act, 78 YALE L.J. 1404 (1969).
34. ABA INSURANcE MERGER STUDY, supra note 33, at 80. The statutes which regulate
insurance mergers prohibited by the Clayton Act, enacted by 19 states as of 1966, have

a different purpose than the holding company provisions discussed in notes 36-39 and
accompanying text, infra. The former are designed to assure competition and the latter
primarily to assure solvency of the acquired insurer. Moreover, the applicability of the

state anti-merger statutes to conglomerate insurance mergers is unclear while the holding
company acts were specifically designed to deal with such mergers.
35. Id.
36. STATE oF NEw YORK INSURANCE DEPt., REPORT OF TE SPECIAL Coan nn=a ON
INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANIES (1968).
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investigations, and reporting procedures3 7 which help the insurance
department regulate the acquired insurer in its larger corporate setting." Only five of the reporting states prohibited holding companies
37.

Id. at 53-54. The committee found the following kinds of laws:

Laws, Type of
Examination of holding companies.
Examination of non-insurance subsidiaries of domestic insurers.
Reporting by holding companies required.
Reporting by non-insurance subsidiaries of domestic insurers.
Commitments required by holding company to Insurance Dept.
Investigating powers beyond the scope of the foregoing, either
in connection with examination of domestic insurers or to
determine whether Insurance Law has been violated.
Formation of holding companies in insurance business prohibited.
(Prohibit the formation of corporations, or the public offerings of their securities, to act as holding companies for
new domestic insurers-4 states. Prohibit the formation
of an insurer by a holding company-1 state).
Specifically authorize the formation of insurance holding companies.
(Exchange of stock-3 states. Concession of insurer to holding company-2 states).
Prior approval of insurance commissioner for formation of insurance holding company.
Regulation of securities offerings of insurance holding companies.
Note: The above table reflects considerable overlap.

No. of States
17
10
3
2
2
3
5

5

3
2

38. Most states regulate the types of investments which insurers may make. However,
it is somewhat doubtful that such regulation will prevent insurers from loaning money to
their affiliates, and consequently doubtful that it will prevent the anti-competitive incident
of such transactions.
For instance, New York's recently enacted Insurance Company Holding Act, N.Y.
INS. LAW § 69e (McKinney Supp. 1970), provides that loans between domestic insurers
and any person in its holding company system shall be fair and equitable and that
charges or fees for services performed shall be reasonable. Prior written approval must
be obtained from the Superintendent of Insurance for any transaction between an
insurer and any company in its holding company system which involves more than 5%
of the insurer's admitted assets; and notice of such transaction must be given to the
Superintendent if more than Y2% of admitted assets are involved. Note that there is
little reason for the Superintendent not to approve the transaction if the loan is secure
and does not impair the financial position of the insurer, since the states are not
primarily concerned with the anti-trust aspects of conglomerate insurance meregers.
Moreover, in a large conglomerate it would be possible to avoid the requirement of
Commission approval by giving loans of up to 5% of admitted assets of each of numerous
small affiliates.
Other states' statutes are even less restrictive. California, for instance, prohibits insurers
from loaning over 10% capital stock and capital surplus to any one borrower if security
consists of shares of capital stock of one or more corporations. CAr.. INs. CODE § 1197
(West 1955). A 1963 amendment, CAL. INs. CODE § 1198 (West Supp. 1971) further
limits such loans, requiring loans upon or purchase of stock in any one company not to
exceed 10% of the excess of admitted assets over liabilities and required reserves. Washington requires the permission of the Insurance Commissioner if an insurer is to have
investments or loan upon the security of any single person or institution in an amount
exceeding 4% of admitted assets. WAsn. REv. CODE § 48.13.030 (1947).
Consequently, there are strong reasons to doubt that even modem holding company
legislation, designed primarily to prevent flagrant appropriation of insurers' excess assets,
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and only two gave the Insurance Commissioner discretion to prohibit
such acquisitions.3 9
Statutes which only provide for examination of holding companies
may not constitute a basis for "state regulation" within the meaning
of the Act. In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,40 the Court
held that state statutes providing a public utility approach 41 to rate
setting were not similar enough in purpose to the Clayton Act to cause
the latter to be displaced under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. If this
result is correct, then there is even more reason to suspect that the
same result will obtain in the case of holding company acts which
merely require reporting and which have little bearing on competition.
However, it should be noted that if a statute is similar enough in
purpose to the Clayton Act, then under FTC v. National Casualty
Co., 2 a mere failure of a state to enforce its laws will not provide a
basis to escape the McCarran-Ferguson Act and apply federal antitrust laws.
In addition to the requirement of a relevant state statute, state
regulation requires that the state have jurisdiction. It is clear that
there must be territorial jurisdiction, i.e., there must be sufficient contact with the regulating state to make the insurance company generally
subject to that state's laws. Second, the state, for purposes of "state
regulation" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, may regulate only
those practices which have impact within its borders; it may not regulate extra-territorially.
will prevent the anti-competitive consequences inherent in the acquisition of an insurer
by a manufacturing corporation.
39. See note 37, supra.
40. 242 F. Supp. 56 (NfD. El. 1965). See notes 47-48 and accompanying text, infra.
41. The "public utility" approach referred to is simply a system whereby the states
regulate the premiums charged for insurance coverage to assure that they are set at
reasonable levels.
42. 357 U.S. 560 (1968). In that case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of
the Sth and 6th Circuits, which set aside FTC orders requiring two insurance companies
to cease and desist from engaging in false and deceptive advertising. The advertising
material was distributed to local agents who in turn transmitted it to the public. All
states concerned had statutes governing such advertising. Petitioners contended that the
advertising activities should not be exempt from the Federal Trade Commission Act
because (1) constitutional limits of state territorial jurisdiction did not make state
regulation possible, and (2) such regulation was inchoate (no enforcement) and was
not "state regulation" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court
accepted the possibility that limitations on state jurisdiction might make state regulation
under the act impossible, but said this was not such a case since the states clearly had
power to regulate the advertising practices of agents. The Court rejected petitioners'
second contention, holding that the existence of a state statute was sufficient to coistitute
regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
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The general rule as to territorial jurisdiction requires active solicitation of policyholders in a state before the state has power to regulate
the relationship between those policyholders and the insurer, and
hence makes the McCarran-Ferguson restrictions on federal action
applicable." When this rule is applied to conglomerate insurance
mergers it seems clear that it will almost always be satisfied in that
there will usually be sufficient contacts to subject the company to the
states' laws. Normally a state which affirmatively undertakes regulation of such a merger will have substantial contacts with the company.
The second possible restriction of state regulation, however, the
inability to regulate extra-territorially, will be difficult to avoid. In
FTC v. Travelers Health Association,4 4 a Nebraska insurance corporation, licensed to do business only in Nebraska and Virginia, conducted
mail order business in every state. The FTC entered a cease and
desist order prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices. Before the
Supreme Court the insurance company argued that a Nebraska statute
prohibiting such advertising, both within and without Nebraska, constituted "state regulation" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The
Court rejected this contention, holding that the only type of regulation

43. In State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962), Texas levied
a tax on a contract of insurance covering real property located in Texas. The insurer
did not do business in Texas and the contract of insurance was entered into outside of
Texas. The Court held that Texas did not have power to levy the tax, stating that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act merely repealed the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, leaving
intact prior decisions which held that a state has no power to tax insurance contracts
entered into outside of the state. See text accompanying note 31, supra.
Subsequent cases have pretty much limited Todd to its facts, however. In Ministers
Life & Cas. Union v. Haase, 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S.
205 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1033 (1967), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the state had power to tax and regulate foreign insurers who were soliciting mail
order business in Wisconsin but had no offices there. The court denied respondent
insurance company's claim that such regulation was a denial of due process. The court
distinguished Todd since the insurer there had not solicited business in Texas, and held
that the active and continuous solicitation of business by Ministers Life amounted to
entering the state and doing business, creating sufficient minimum contacts to allow
regulation under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
A similar case arose later in California, when the state brought an action to enjoin
foreign mail order insurers from soliciting business in the state without first getting a
certificate of authority from the Insurance Commissioner as required by California law.
People v. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 685, 427 P.2d 199, 58 Cal. Rptr. 599,
appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 330 (1967). Todd was distinguished under a contacts analysis
similar to that used in the Wisconsin case, and the state's power to regulate was upheld.
See also FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n.,
362 U.S. 293 (1960); and United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56
(N.D. Ill. 1965).
44. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
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intended to displace the federal statutes was regulation of the state
where the deception is practiced and has its impact. The Court thought
that allowing regulation of practices affecting all states by any one
state would be inconsistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act's purpose
of keeping regulation of insurance close to the people.
The Travelers Health and National Casualty 5 cases indicate that a
state may not, for purposes of "state regulation" under the McCarranFerguson Act, regulate the extra-territorial conduct of an insurer who
is present within the state. If this rule is applied to conglomerate insurance mergers, exceptional difficulties in meeting the state regulation
requirement will be encountered. Normally, such mergers will have
multi-state impact, and approval or disapproval would have extraterritorial implications. Although the question has not been authoritatively determined, it has been considered in two district court cases,48
and both courts concluded that the states could not regulate extra-territorially and meet the "state regulation" requirement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Both cases in effect held that insurance company
mergers were subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,4 7 the court extensively
analyzed the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Chicago
Title & Trust, an Illinois corporation, acquired Kansas City Title
Company, a Missouri corporation, and the government brought an
action to nullify the merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
defendants contended that an Illinois antitrust statute and both Wisconsin's and Illinois' "reasonable rate" statutes, providing a public
utility approach to insurance rates, constituted "state regulation" barring application of Section 7 under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In
rejecting this defense and granting the government's motion for partial
summary judgment, the court held the merger subject to Section 7.
Two major reasons were given for the decision. First, relying primarily
on the Travelers Health and National Casualty cases, the court said
that "state regulation" did not confer upon states the right to regulate
extra-territorially under the Act, and that only regulation by the state

45. See note 42, supra.
46. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust, 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. fli. 1965), and
Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 232 F. Supp. 620 (D.D.C. 1964) in Finding
of Fact No. 2, reported in 1964 Trade Cas. 79,717,. 79,719 (1964).
47. 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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in which the practice has its impact operates to displace federal law.
The court thought this position necessary to prevent one state from
denying the residents of other states the protection of federal laws.
Second, in an analysis that foreshadowed the Supreme Court's treatment of the "business of insurance" in the later case of SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.,4" the court found the Clayton Act and the state ratemaking statutes not comparable, since the latter reaches only the pricing aspects of competition while the former has much broader goals.
If the analysis of the court in Chicago Title & Trust is accepted,
a state will rarely have sufficient jurisdiction to satisfy the "state
regulation" requirement of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. This result
seems sound. First, it is consistent with Travelers Health. Second, as
will be discussed more fully under the "business of insurance" discussion,4" the result is consistent with both the federal interest in assuring
a competitive economy and the state interest in the solvency of the
insurer. Third, any other holding would allow one state to deny citizens
of other states the benefits of the Clayton Act. The last concern is not
illusory; many states might feel that it is desirable to assure competition in the insurance industry without displacing the federal act, thus
taking advantage of the larger and better-equipped federal enforcement agencies.
The state obviously has some power to prohibit or regulate insurance
company mergers, since the state can refuse to license the insurer to
do business within the state; this power, however, is not jurisdiction.
It is elementary law that jurisdiction generally requires authority to
render a judgment which another court will recognize, ° and simple
intrastate prohibitory power does not satisfy that requirement. Once
it is decided that a state lacks jurisdiction, then, despite any de facto
power the state may have, the Clayton Act will be given effect, and
state action will be superseded.
In conclusion, it seems unlikely that in most conglomerate insurance
company mergers the "state regulation" requirement will be met. Often
no state concerned will have a statute which qualifies, and even if there

48. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). For a more complete discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 51-58, infra.
49. See notes 51-57 and accompanying text, infra.
So. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 5, comment d at 25-26 (1942); Budhanan
v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (K.B. 1808).
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is one, it is unlikely that in the case of a conglomerate insurance
merger, which usually will have multi-state impact, any state affected
will have sufficient jurisdiction.
B. The Business of Insurance
Even if there is "state regulation," the antitrust exemption applies
only to the "business of insurance." The Supreme Court defined the
term "business of insurance" as used in the first part of Section 2 (b)
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in SEC v. National Securities, Inc."
There, Producers Life Insurance Company had made communications
to shareholders regarding a proposed merger with National Securities,
and misrepresentations arising out of those communications were the
subject of the SEC suit under Rule 10b-5.5 2 Arizona had a statute governing proxies and insurance mergers and, pursuant to that statute, the
Arizona Director of Insurance had approved the merger which was
consummated pending appeal. When the SEC sought divestiture, however, the Court held that the misrepresentations were outside the "business of insurance," and hence outside the McCarran-Ferguson Act, so
that the Securities Exchange Act of 193458 and the regulations thereunder superseded Arizona's conflicting law, leaving the SEC with a
valid action under Rule 10b-5.
The Court saw the "business of insurance" as encompassing only
the insurance company-policyholder relationship. This relationship
would include any matter which bears on the protection of the policyholder, such as the regulation of rates, the licensing of companies and
their agents, the selling and advertising of policies, the type of policy
issued, or its interpretation, reliability, and enforcement. 4 Since the
principal case involved the regulation of insurance company-stockholder relationships, the Court felt that the state statute was properly
classified as securities regulation, rather than regulation of the "business of insurance".
The National Securities case clearly implies that Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is applicable to insurance mergers. 5 Although the case
51. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).

53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
54. 393 US. at 459-61.
55. Id. at 451-64. See Note, Insurance Mergers and the Clayton Act, 78 YALE LJ. 1404
(1969), where the author reached a similar conclusion.
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arose under the more generalized provisions of Section 2(b) of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act,56 there is no reason that the term "business
of insurance" should have a different meaning in the proviso of
Section 2(b) dealing with the anti-trust exemption, and mergers are
clearly a part of the stockholder-company relationship.
The distinctions and balancing of interests which the Court made
between the federal interest in protection of stockholders and the state's
interest in protection of policyholders in the National Securities case
seem sound. The Court saw no conflict between those interests, and
there is little reason to expect that the conclusion will or should be
different in the case of either horizontal or conglomerate insurance
mergers. The federal interest in the organization and concentration of
the National economy will be at least as consistent with the states'
interest in protecting the policyholder as was the stockholder protec7
tion policy of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
Of course, a merger might result in improved services to the policyholder, but this would normally occur only in the case of the merger
of a failing company since the merger of two healthy companies seldom
yields a net increase in service. However, even this potential conflict
is minimized by the "failing company doctrine," which provides more
liberal rules for mergers of failing companies.58 Further, it should be
noted that while a state has an interest in regulating the new combine
and, in the case of a conglomerate insurance merger, may need to go
to great lengths to insure that assets are not dissipated, this interest
cannot arise, at least with healthy insurance companies, until the
merger is complete.

56. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964). Basically, the first part provides that no act of Congress
shall impair or supersede any state law which is designed to regulate the "business of
insurance." The second part is a proviso which provides that the Sherman, Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts are applicable "to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by state law." See text accompanying note 30, supra.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
58. See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). In that case a merger
was allowed between International Shoe and the failing W.H. McElwain Co. The
Court found that McElwain faced the grave possibility of a business failure, that the
products manufactured by each were dissimilar, and that the merger was not purshed
in contemplation of restraining commerce within the meaning of the Clayton Act.
Recent cases seem to have narrowed the doctrine from that stated in the above case,
so that it now appears that § 7 is inapplicable only if the acquired firm is in such bad
financial shape that its termination seems unavoidable, Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC,
291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961), and if the acquiring corporation is the only available
purchaser, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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Since a merger is a matter of the stockholder-company relationship,
and since the policy considerations are similar to those in National
Securities, it seems fair to conclude that the rule stated there would
be extended to Section 7 so that even state regulation of horizontal
insurance mergers would not be regulation of the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. If Section
7 applies to horizontal insurance mergers, then a fortiori it will apply
to mergers of insurance companies with non-insurance corporations.
In conclusion, it seems almost certain that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act will not prevent application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to
conglomerate insurance mergers and that in most cases there will be
two independently sustainable grounds for so holding. "State regulation" will probably not be present, and even if it is, such mergers are
outside of the "business of insurance" to which the anti-trust exemption applies. The remainder of this paper is devoted to an analysis of
Section 7, and the cases decided thereunder, in order to determine its
impact on conglomerate insurance mergers.
III. APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
TO CONGLOMERATE INSURANCE MERGERS
The merger of an insurance company with an industrial corporation
has three consequences which are of potential significance under Section 7.59 First, potential borrowers are denied a source of credit to the
extent the acquired insurance corporation prefers its parent and affiliates on loans." Second, the competitive position of the parent and
affiliates will be strengthened by an easy source of credit." Third, the
parent's power over the sale of insurance and lending of capital, widely
demanded by business of all types, presents the opportunity for the

59.

Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731,

provides in part as follows:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation . . . shall

acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.
60. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text, supra.

61. See p. 504, supra.
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imposition of reciprocal buying and selling patterns with attendant
anti-competitive effects in several markets.62
Each of the three possible rationales for finding a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act will be discussed separately, as far as is
possible. It should be realized, however, that all are analytically intertwined, and will have to be discussed together to the extent that anticompetitive effects in all three areas add up to a Section 7 violation
when no one alone would be sufficient.
A. The Vertical Merger Cases
The availability of a product to a consumer is usually attributable
to successive work performed by several distinct groups of firms, each
performing different tasks, and representing a different stage of the
total production and marketing process. For example, in the oil industry the groups would consist of crude oil and gas extractors, refiners,
jobbers and retailers. For lack of a better term these various groups
will be called "sub-industries." The typical pattern" in the vertical
merger cases is for a manufacturing corporation which is dominant in
its area of primary operation to integrate, by way of merger, with a
firm in a related sub-industry either forward toward the consumer
market or backward toward the source of raw materials.
Several economic effects of such vertical mergers can be isolated. If
the acquiring firm now purchases all or a substantial part of the acquired firm's production, the firms in the acquired corporation's subindustry may be deprived of a vital outlet, and the non-vertically
integrated firms in the acquiring corporation's sub-industry may be
deprived of a vital source of supply. These potential effects, referred
to as "foreclosure" of the market, have been of paramount importance
to the outcome in previous vertical merger cases. 64

62. See p. 504-05, supra.
63. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218
(1947); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd mem., 382 U.S. 12
(1965); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n,
168 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. New York
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (ED. IlM. 1946).
64. Cases in note 63, supra.

518

Insurance Mergers

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,"5 one of the earliest vertical merger
cases, remains the best statement of the principles governing such
mergers. Brown Shoe, the nation's fourth largest manufacturer of
shoes, purchased Kinney, a small manufacturer of shoes which owned
a relatively large chain of retail outlets, creating a merger with both
horizontal and vertical aspects. Kinney produced 0.5 percent of the
nation's shoes and retailed 1.2 percent of all shoes sold in the United
States. There had been a very definite trend for manufacturers of shoes
to acquire retail outlets, and Brown had participated in that trend.
Reasoning that Section 7 was intended to arrest a merger trend in its
incipiency and hence required only an evaluation of the probable effect
of the merger, the Court held that the merger violated Section 7 in
both horizontal and vertical aspects. After the merger, Brown had
forced its shoes on Kinney's retail outlets. When the resultant market
foreclosure was evaluated in the context of the general trend toward
acquisitions of retail outlets, the Court thought the effect would be to
substantially lessen competition.
The Court, in interpreting the statute, indicated the analytical framework under which vertical mergers were to be examined. First, since
the Act applies only to reduction of competition in "any line of commerce in any section of the country," a product market, defined by
"reasonable interchangeability of use ' 6 6 between the product and its
substitutes, and a geographic market, determined by the effective area
of competition, must be selected to determine the scope of competition.
Next, although the Court stated that vertical mergers act as a "clog
on competition ' 67 and hence might tend to reduce competition by giving vertically integrated firms in the relevant market an advantage
over their non-integrated rivals, it indicated that only those vertical
mergers which substantially lessen competition would be proscribed,
69. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
66. In Brown Shoe, the court stated:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand ... for it. However, within
this broad market, well defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for anti-trust purposes ....
The boundaries of such a submarket
may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the products's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices,
sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.
370 U.S. at 325 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 324.
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and that the probable effect of the merger in the relevant market musl
therefore be determined.
The first step in this determination is an examination of the effeci
upon competition of the market foreclosure resulting from the challenged merger. In determining the effects of foreclosure, the size ol
the market share foreclosed is important, since a larger foreclosed
share translates into a smaller market share for the remaining firm
in the market, and perhaps ultimately, if the share foreclosed is large
enough, into a reduction of the number of firms in the market and intc
the onset of oligopolistic pricing patterns." It is clear, however, that
the probability and extent of future market evolutions cannot be ascertained from the size of the market share foreclosed alone. Therefore,
the Court laid out a number of additional factors to be considered in
determining the probable future effect, including the economic purpose
of the merger, concentration of the affected market, and any trends
6
towards concentration and vertical mergers in the affected markets. 1
A number of small vertical mergers, of course, can have the same
results as one or more large ones, and the Court attached great significance to this consideration. In fact, articulating a new and alternative
step in the determination of the effect of the merger on competition,
the Court undertook to assess the probable future effects of the merger
trend. Relying on that trend, the Court found the merger illegal despite
potential foreclosure of only 1.5 percent and actual foreclosure at the
70
time of trial of .12 percent.
Finally, although it did not rely on this consideration, the Court
indicated that as a third step in the determination of a merger's effect
it must look beyond effects upon particular markets and consider the
merger's "probable effects upon the way of life sought to be preserved
by Congress.

'71

Subsequent cases have added little to this basic

analytic framework for vertical mergers, although several lower court
72
opinions have perhaps extended the principles in Brown Shoe.

68. For a detailed analysis of these patterns and their detrimental effects, see J.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Ch. 8 (1959).
69.

370 U.S. at 328-33.

70. Id. at 334.
71. Id. at 333.
72. See, e.g., A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd mer., 382
U.S. 12 (1965); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
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In many respects the -vertical merger cases -seem to be applicable
to conglomerate insurance mergers. Capital is a requirement of all
productive enterprises, for only with capital can the necessary labor,
materials, and facilities be obtained. If capital is viewed in this manner, then the acquisition of a major supplier of capital by, for example, a large manufacturer who is a substantial consumer of capital has
competitive effects somewhat similar to those proscribed by Section 7
in the vertical merger cases. The merger would pose foreclosure problems in the credit market. It would be expected that the acquiring
corporation would now purchase substantial amounts of capital from
the acquired insurance company; hence, a certain number of purchasers of capital would be foreclosed from purchasing credit from the
acquired insurance company, and other insurance companies and lenders would be foreclosed from making loans to the acquired corporation. 3 Thus far the analogy to Section 7 vertical merger cases seems
to be complete.
There is, however, one important and obvious distinction. The demand for capital is common to all economic endeavors, so the purchaser of capital foreclosed by the merger would not usually be in
competition with the acquiring corporation as is normally the case in
vertical merger cases. This distinction is important because it points
up a crucial difference between the typical vertical merger pattern,
such as appeared in the Brown Shoe decision, and the pattern in a
conglomerate insurance merger. In the former the primary concern
is to prevent an oligopolistic situation from developing as medium

and small sized firms suffer the consequences of foreclosure. In the
insurance merger situation, on the other hand, there seems to be little
danger that foreclosure would result in increased concentration in the
insurance industry; rather, the primary impact of foreclosure would
fall on other purchasers of capital who are deprived of a vital source
of supply in a relatively scarce "commodity". These purchasers, how-

73. The analysis focuses on foreclosure in the credit market. The same argument can
be made with respect to sales of insurance, and, incidentally, the analogy to the :vertical
merger cases is much clearer. Such an argument was made in United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 F. Supp. 766, 792-95 (D. Conn. 1969), discussed more fully
in notes 116-120 and accompanying text, infra. The court did not reject the argument in
theory, but rather refused to issue a preliminary injunction on that theory because the
evidence was critically deficient in a number of respects, including the strength- of the
conglomerate merger trend.

521

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 497, 1971

ever, would not be expected to be in the same market as the parent
of the insurance company, as a strict analogy to Brown Shoe would
require. The primary danger from conglomerate insurance mergers
seems to be cumulative foreclosures which remove a substantial portion of the market from competitive influence, and it is not certain
that the principles enunciated in Brown Shoe would reach such mergers.
It could be argued that there is no necessity to show a probability
that the merger would cause an increase in concentration in a particular industry, and that substantial foreclosure alone would be sufficient
to "substantially reduce competition" within the meaning of Section 7.
This view seems logical; the Court is normally concerned about probable future concentration because high concentration means less competition, which in turn translates into fewer benefits to the public.
Competition, however, need not be defined with respect to market
structures and oligopolistic pricing patterns. When evaluating insurance mergers we are concerned with, among other things, the proper
functioning of the credit market so that it may cause the limited
resources of the nation to be allocated equitably.74 We are not so
much concerned that the merger will cause interest rates to be higher;
these, in effect, are controlled by the Federal Reserve Board and the
Treasury."5 Consequently, the meaning of competition is truly different when one speaks of the credit market; there, it means a state where
the lenders are independent, impartial, and make their loans in such
a manner as to maximize the lending firms' profitability.
The problem with attempting to show a substantial reduction in
competition on the basis of foreclosure alone is that, while some of
the language concerning foreclosure in Brown Shoe lends support to
this analysis, neither that case nor any other provides direct support
for the position. Nevertheless, the increasing scope of the merger trend
among insurance companies through 1968, the strength of the supporting arguments, and the dicta contained in Brown Shoe"6 which di74. See text accompanying note 25, supra.
75. The Federal Reserve System and the Treasury Department are the agencies which
effectuate the nation's monetary policy. Together, they have various powers which exert
a significant impact on the amount of credit available and the interest rates. The powers
are usually used to help promote a stable but expanding economy. See generally BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,

POSES AND FUNCTONS 123-47 (5th ed. 1963);

J:

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,

KLEIN, MONEY AN

PUR-

TnE EcowoNMY 182-

248 (1965).
76. It would seem that conglomerate insurance mergers are a proper area for applica-
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rects us to look beyond technical market analysis and consider the
"probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to be preserved
by Congress,"" all indicate that foreclosure alone can be sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a substantial reduction in competition. If
this argument does prevail, some conglomerate insurance mergers
may violate the Clayton Act.
The preliminary step in evaluating individual mergers, under the
analytic framework developed in Brown Shoe, is to determine the
relevant product market. There seems to be little question that credit
operations can be "a line of commerce" within the meaning of Section
7. In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank,78 the Court said:7 9
We agree with the District Court that the cluster of products
(various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking accounts
and trust administration) denoted by the term "commercial
banking" composes a distinct line of commerce.
In that case the Court was dealing with a horizontal bank merger.
Since both banks provided similar sets of services, there was no need
to distinguish between credit operations and account operations. The
analogous distinction in insurance is between underwriting and credit
operations. Given the Court's flexible approach in dealing with competitive effects, there is little reason to think that the distinction will
not be made in the case of conglomerate insurance mergers. Consequently, it seems safe to deal with the credit market as at least one
of the relevant markets in which to assess the competitive effects of the
merger.
The difficult question as to the relevant market is the extent to
which the total credit market can be divided into submarkets for
anti-trust purposes. In Brown Shoe, the Court declared that a product
market is defined by the "reasonable interchangeability of use" 0 be-

tion of the statement in Brown Shoe, namely, that the Court may look beyond the
particular markets and consider the merger's "probable effects upon the economic way of
life sought to be preserved by Congress." 370 U.S. at 333. As indicated in notes 25-26
and accompanying text, supra, conglomerate insurance mergers might easily have repercussions throughout the economy insofar as they impair the resource allocation
function of the credit market.
77. 370 U.S. at 333.
78. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
79. Id. at 356.
80. 370 U.S. at 325.
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tween the product and its substitutes; in PhiladelphiaNational Bank,
the Court thought that commercial banking was sufficiently distinctive
to be the relevant market for anti-trust purposes. Hence, it is quite
possible that insurance company lending would be similarly treated,
so that the relevant market would not have to include other lending
institutions. The well-known tendency for insurance companies to deal
in long-term credit, with banks dealing in shorter term notes, 8 lends
support to this conclusion. The market might be broken down still
further in terms of the mortgage market, corporate bond market, and
government bond market, etc., representing various recognized credit
submarkets. And, it is possible that the market may be broken down
further still on the basis of types of risk such as aero-space, steel,
large conglomerates, etc. Moreover, since one of the ultimate answers
being sought through determination of the relevant credit market is
the percentage of that market foreclosed by the merger, it can be
argued that the market should be limited to the general kinds of credit
for which the acquiring corporation has demand (e.g., corporate bond
market or the relevant submarkets thereof). Such an approach would
most rationally delimitate the competitive effects of the merger.
Ultimately the resolution of the relevant market will depend upon
the specific facts of the case and a practical economic analysis of the
credit markets in which the insurance company is lending. It seems
probable that narrowing the credit market by submarket identification,
and by additional geographical limitation, if appropriate, will produce
a relevant market much smaller than a general credit market consisting of all the banks, savings and loan associations and insurance companies in the nation. It seems highly probable that the smaller category
will be deemed the relevant market.
Once the relevant market is identified, the effects of the proposed
merger upon it must be evaluated. The first step in this evaluation
measures the effects of the foreclosure and potential foreclosure arising from the proposed merger itself.
In Brown Shoe, Kinney, the acquired corporation, had only 1.5 percent of the retail shoe market, and at the time of trial only 7.9 percent
of the shoes sold by Kinney we e made by Brown Shoe.8 Hence, the
81. R. JoHNsoN, FiNANCiAL MANAGEMNT 333-34 (2nd ed. 1962).
82. 370 U.S. at 303-04. Before the merger Kinney had purchased no shoes from
Brown Shoe.
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amount of the relevant market actually foreclosed amounted to only
.12 percent, and the potential foreclosure was only 1.5 percent.
While the insurance industry is not heavily concentrated, the leading
insurers in both property/liability and life probably have shares of the
credit market which are not de minimis under Brown Shoe. For 1968,
life insurance companies had admitted assets of $188 billion 3 while
the property/liability section of the industry had nearly $51.2 billion;8 4 when the two sectors of the insurance industry are combined,
there are approximately $239.2 billion of admitted assets. Hartford
Insurance, the sixth largest property/liability insurer, has $1.9 billion
of admitted assets,85 or about .81 percent of the total life and property/
liability assets. Prudential (Newark), the largest life insurer, had
$26.6 billion in assets"6 (well over 10 percent of the total), and Massachusetts Mutual, the 10th largest life insurer, had $3.9 billion S7 or
about 1.6 percent of the total. If it can be assumed that the relative
volume of credit operations is roughly proportionate to admitted assets,88 then, of course, Prudential would have well over 1.5 percent of
the relevant credit market, although Hartford would have somewhat
less than 1.5 percent.
It is apparent that most property/liability insurers will not possess
1.5 percent of the insurance credit market, while at least the leading

83. See note 3, supra.
84. The 50 Largest Life Insurance Companies, FoRTuNE, May, 1969, at 192-93.
85. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ITDUsTRY FPORT, supra note 12, at 105.
86. FoRT NE supra note 84, at 192.
87. Id.
88. In 1968 life insurance companies had 86.1 percent of admitted assets invested in
bonds, stock and mortgages, BEST'S NsURANcE REPORTS, Luz/HsnLrU INSURANCE EDInoX
at x (1969 ed.). For the same year stock life and casualty companies had 84.4 percent
of their admitted assets in stocks, bonds and second loans. BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES
PROPERTY-LABILITY 52 (1969 ed.) (hereinafter referred to as AGGREGATES & AVERAGES).
Hence, it would that appear that both sections of the industry have roughly the same
percentage of assets invested in the credit market, at least if stock holdings are induded.
There are significant differences in the investment portfolios of the two sections. Both
industries held roughly 42-43 percent of admitted assets in bonds, although the life
insurance sector tended to hold substantially fewer government and more industrial
bonds than its property/liability counterpart. The remaining portion of assets invested
in the credit market was invested in stock (40 percent of admitted assets) in the property/
liability sectors, while for life insurance companies only 7 percent of assets was held in
stocks with 37 percent of assets invested'in mortgages. In contrast, the property liability
sector invested only .2 percent of assets in mortgages.
The property/liability figures given above covered only stock companies. Mutual
property liability companies had similar portfolios, except that 65.5 percent of assets was
invested in bonds with only 21 percent invested in stocks. AGGREGATES & AVERAGES at
152.

525

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 497, 1971

life insurers will possess substantially more than that. The 1.5 percent
figure is not a minimum, however, and under Brown Shoe it is doubtful
that even Hartford's .81 percent is de minimis. Moreover, the above
figures assume one of the broadest possible definitions of the credit
market; a narrower definition would substantially increase the percentage of the relevant credit market held by the leading insurers.
The precise foreclosure required is uncertain since the economic
factors under consideration here are different than in Brown Shoe, but
there is little reason to expect that more would be required. While the
potential foreclosure shares of various insurance firms can be estimated
from industry data, the actual percentage which would be foreclosed
cannot be so estimated, since this would depend upon the amount of
loans which the insurance company would make to its parents and
affiliates. However, it seems probable that in many instances the share
will be substantial. On the basis of this analysis, it appears that if
foreclosure effects alone are deemed sufficient for a finding of illegality,
the Clayton Act may reach at least some conglomerate insurance
mergers.
The rough percentage share which would be foreclosed by a conglomerate insurance merger, however, is not the only factor in the
evaluation of illegality. Under the Brown Shoe framework, the scope
and potential effect of any identifiable trend toward mergers is a separate and equally crucial determination. It is generally agreed that
there is a merger trend (both horizontal and conglomerate) in the
insurance industry,8 9 although data on this trend are difficult to obtain.
As indicated previously,90 it would appear that (1) the absolute
amount of assets involved in insurance mergers is quite substantial;
(2) the insurance merger trend has been accelerating since 1960, and
(3) there has been an increasing tendency for insurance mergers to
be conglomerate. In sum, the conglomerate insurance merger trend
has been pronounced and quite powerful. As noted previously, the
probable future effects of the merger trend will be considered by the
89. One writer noted that he could "hardly leaf through a current insurance journal
without one or more stories of amalgamations being considered, launched or completed."
Williams, Report on the Insurance Merger Handbook, in ABA SEC. INSURANCE NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAW SECTION PROcEmNros 405 (1965). This writer has made
similar observations.
90. See text accompanying notes 1-19, supra.
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court. In effect this means that if the trend seems menacing to the
court, it will hold the merger illegal, and it would seem that the existing
merger trend is sufficiently strong to provide a basis for such a holding.
In addition, it would seem that conglomerate insurance mergers are
a proper area for application of the third element of the test of probable merger effects enunciated in Brown Shoe, namely that the court
may look beyond the particular markets and consider the merger's
"probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to be preserved
by Congress."'1 Conglomerate insurance company mergers can clearly
have repercussions throughout the entire economy.
Finally, it must be recalled that the conclusions from application of
the three tests of merger effects on competition laid out in the Brown
Shoe case are to be considered jointly in the final determination of
illegality. It seems probable that in many cases where damaging effects
to competition isolated under each of the separate inquiries would be
insufficient to support a finding of illegality by itself, the combined
results would support such a finding.
In conclusion, it would be excellent policy to extend the principles
enunciated in Brown Shoe to reach appropriate conglomerate insurance
mergers. Although it is a close question, it would seem probable that
the conglomerate merger trend has reached proportions sufficient to
make foreclosure effects alone illegal-at least if it continues at 1968
levels for very long. Whether the trend will continue remains uncertain, but if it does, a holding of illegality under the vertical merger
cases would be proper in many instances.
B. Transferal of Market Power
In addition to the problem of foreclosure in the credit market, the
acquisition of an insurance company potentially provides the parent
and affiliates with overwhelming additional financial power, and recent
decisions indicate that the potential anti-competitive effects arising
from that power may be deemed illegal.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,92 Clorox, the largest seller of
liquid bleach, was acquired by Procter & Gamble, a diversified seller
of soaps and other household products. Both Procter & Gamble and
91. 370 U.S. at 333.
92. 386 US. 568 (1967).
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Clorox relied heavily on advertising, and the latter had achieved a
significant degree of product differentiation despite the fact that liquid
bleach is a homogeneous product. The Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which had set aside a commission decision holding that the merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Three factors were viewed as important by the Court. First, the
Court was afraid that Procter & Gamble's presence in the relatively
small bleach industry would create barriers to entry and dissuade the
smaller firms from aggressive competition. 3 Second, the Court feared
that Procter & Gamble would be able to obtain volume discounts in
advertising to the severe competitive disadvantage of Clorox's competitors." Third, the Court viewed Procter & Gamble as a potential
competitor wating on the edge of the liquid bleach market.9" Procter
& Gamble had pursued an ambitious program of diversification in related product lines, had considered entering the market independently,
and of all possible entrants was perhaps the best equipped to do so.
While the Procter& Gamble decision does not rest entirely on transferal of market power since the Court also relied on the potential
competition argument, it seems clear that the latter argument is not
a prerequisite to an action in this area. A large firm can no longer
acquire a dominant firm in an industry of relatively small companies
where the acquired firm would obtain marketing advantages by virtue
of the merger. This conclusion was supported by the decision in the
similar case of GeneralFoods Corp. v. FTC.96
93. Id. at 578-79.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 580-81.
96. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). General Foods
purchased S.O.S., the leading seller in the abrasive cleaner market which was dominated
by two firms. After the merger General Foods conducted a promotional campaign which
succeeded in raising the market share of S.O.S. to about 60 percent. The court of appeals
affirmed the commission's decision which held the merger violative of section 7. Three
primary reasons were given for the decision: first, General Foods was able to advertise
S.O.S. less expensively after the merger than before; second, General Foods induced
purchasers (i.e., retailers) to buy S.O.S. through the use of general discounts on all
products purchased from it, including, of course, S.O.S.; third, the court thought General
Foods, because of its power in the household goods market, could secure favorable shelf
space for S.O.S. in retail stores.
In one sense the General Foods decision expands the Procter & Gamble rule, since
the court in the former case did not rely on the potential competition argument. Othervise, General Foods was a much easier case than Procter & Gamble since three definite
areas of promotional advantage were isolated, as opposed to the mere "volume discount"
argument for advertising in Procter & Gamble. Moreover, the effectiveness of the
promotional devices employed by General Foods was clearly demonstrated by the rapid
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While both GeneralFoods and Procter & Gamble involved acquisitions of related product lines, this is not significant as such, since, based
on GeneralFoods, it appears that Procter & Gamble would have been
decided as it was without the potential competition argument. If so,
the Supreme Court's fears of the effects of a volume discount for
advertising and its fear that the financial power of the acquired corporation would create an oligopolistic market would be just as relevant
if a major insurance firm had purchased Clorox, for it was the financial
power and the advertising volume of the parent which primarily concerned the Court.
The soundest view of Procter & Gamble is perhaps the broadest
statement of the opinion that can be made: whenever a competitively
viable firm receives benefits from a merger that puts it at a substantial
competitive advantage and an oligopolistic market is a probable future
result, then that merger has sufficient anti-competitive effects to contravene Section 7 of the Clayton Act.97 This rule would necessarily
be subject to two limitations. First, the acquired firm would have to
be competitive, or perhaps even dominant, since the acquisition of a
weak firm by a giant might aid competition. Second, the acquiring firm
would have to be much bigger than the dominant firm in the acquired
corporation's industry. Under this interpretation of the cases many
conglomerate acquisitions could be prescribed by Section 7, but even
under this broad interpretation it would apparently be quite difficult
to apply the rule to most conglomerate insurance company mergers.
Previous judicial analysis focused on the effects of the acquisition
on the acquired corporation's market. Conversely, the focus in the insurance merger is the effect on the acquiring parent's and affiliates'
markets. This turnabout, however, does not affect the governing prinrise in S.O.S.'s market share after the merger. Consequently, it can be argued that the
views stated in Procter & Gamble relative to transferal of market power are the more
far-reaching.
97. In United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn.
1969), discussed more fully at note 116 and accompanying text, infra, one of the arguments made by the government against ITT's acquisition of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. was
that access, by subsidiaries of ITT such as Levit & Sons (residential construction), to
Hartford's considerable "surplus surplus" of over $400 million would give those subsidiaries such a competitive advantage as to make the merger illegal under the Procter &
Gamble rationale. The court, in the preliminary injunction proceeding, did not reject the
theory, but in the face of ITT's uncontroverted evidence that it would not use Hartford
for such purposes, it held that the evidence would not support a finding of reasonable
probability of success on the merits.
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ciples; the principles developed in the Procter & Gamble, General
Foods, and FTC v. Reynolds Metals Co." decisions would still be
contravened if it could be shown that the increase in financial power
caused by the merger would give the parent or affiliate, already competitive in its respective market, sufficient competitive advantage to
create a probability that a substantial reduction in competition would
result." Some other differences in pattern between conglomerate insurance mergers and the typical conglomerate merger, however, are
material.
The typical conglomerate insurance merger will not create as pronounced an anti-competitive effect as the acquisition by a giant of a
small but competitive firm in an industry of relative midgets. The
acquiring parent will be at least as large as the insurance company,
making it doubtful that the financial effect upon the parent's operations, and in turn upon competition, would be sufficient to invoke
Section 7. Consequently, the primary area of concern will be the
smaller subsidiaries of the conglomerate parent. However, the subsidiaries already have the backing of the parent, so again it is doubtful
whether the financial effect of the merger would normally be sufficient
to cause a substantial reduction in competition.
Perhaps the rule of Procter & Gamble could be effectively invoked
only where the conglomerate parent or its subsidiaries had previously
had difficulty meeting its own capital needs or even borrowing money
on generally favorable terms, or where the parent had a subsidiary with

98. FTC v. Reynolds Metals Co., 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See note 99, infra.
99. In FTC v. Reynolds Metals Co., Reynolds, the world's largest producer of
aluminum foil, acquired Arrow Brands, Inc., a small company having 30 percent of the
market of aluminum foil sold to florists, a specialty product. After the merger Arrow
had lowered its price to a level that could not be matched by its competitors and
increased its market share by 19 percent. The court held that the merger was illegal,
relying primarily on the now famous "deep pocket" theory:
The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" . . . in a competitive group where
previously no company was very large and all were relatively small opened the
possibility and power to sell at prices approximating cost or below and thus to
undercut and ravage the less affluent competition.
Id. at 229-30. Arguably, the theory of the opinion was spawned by injudicious price
cutting and would not be viable in the absence of such behavior which is quite unusual
in today's world and hence an inappropriately remote factor on which to base a finding
oi illegality. An answer to this argument is that the mere existence of such market
power constitutes a veiled threat which would deter the competitors of the acquired
firm from engaging in price competition. The diverse economic sanctions available to the
acquired firm, such as price cutting and substantially increased marketing expenditures,
would not be lost on its competitors.
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voracious capital needs which had in part gone unserviced.'0 0 In those
cases, it could be argued that the accretion of economic power is substantial and that anti-competitive effects would probably evidence
themselves in various markets in which affiliates dealt.
In evaluating even the last position, it must be borne in mind that
the argument extends the principles of Procter& Gamble and Reynolds
even beyond that required to reach a typical conglomerate merger.
Many commentators do not believe that this extension is possible,10
but this view seems to ignore the power of the conglomerate merger
movement, its threat to the values supposed to be preserved by the
anti-trust laws, and the great lengths to which the Supreme Court has
gone in order to proscribe a great variety of mergers. Nevertheless,
one should be cautious in asserting that the principles, as presently
enunciated, will reach the milder effects of conglomerate insurance
mergers. 0 2 Such an extension would be excellent policy, but it is mere
conjecture to predict whether it will ever occur.
C. Reciprocal Dealing Cases
Conglomerate mergers can present opportunities for reciprocitythe conditioning of purchases of the parent or affiliate on receipt of
orders for the product of an affiliate (or vice versa)-and such potential reciprocity may sometimes constitute a Section 7 violation.
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,'°0 for example, Consolidated,
a large food wholesaler, purchased Gentry, a manufacturer of dehydrated onions and garlic which held about 32 percent of the combined
markets at the time of merger. Many of Consolidated's suppliers were
customers of Gentry, and after the merger there was evidence that
Consolidated was using its purchasing power to force its suppliers to
100. An example might be the case of International Telephone and Telegraph's subsidiary Levit & Sons (residential construction) in the ITT-Hartford merger case. See
notes 97, supra, and 116, infra.

101. See, e.g., Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HAnv. L. RPy. 1313 (1965); Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven:
The Limitations of the Anti-merger Act, 68 CoLum. L. Rav. 1231 (1968).
102. See, e.g., Butler Aviation v. CAB, 389 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1968), where Judge
Friendly rejected arguments that the merger of Remmert-Werer (which sold North
American business jets) with Eastern Airlines would result in promotional advantages in
such a manner that it would be illegal under the Procter & Gamble rule. Other market
power transferal cases of importance are EKCO Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th
Cir. 1965) and United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
103. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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buy from Gentry. The Supreme Court denounced such practices, saying reciprocity "results in 'an irrelevant and alien factor' ... intruding
into the choice among competing products, creating at the least 'a
priority on the business at equal prices'."'0 4 Gentry's share of the
dehydrated onion market increased by 7 percent while its share of the
garlic market decreased by 12 percent after the merger. 0 5 Despite the
equivocal results of the reciprocity program the Court held the merger
violated Section 7, reasoning that it was clear that the reciprocal dealing gave Gentry a protected market and that its share of the garlic
market might have fallen still further without it.' 6 Significantly, the
Court indicated that the actual existence of the post-merger reciprocal
dealing does not have to be shown; it is sufficient if there is a probabil0 7
ity of such practices.
The Consolidated Food decision, however, left two major questions
unresolved. First, it is unclear whether proof of past reciprocity practices is required or whether showing a market structure conducive to
reciprocal dealing will be sufficient to prove a probability of reciprocal
dealing, and there is no indication of the weight to be given to an
affirmative defense which tends to show that the acquiring company
has a policy prohibiting reciprocity. Second, it is not clear whether the
Consolidated Foods rule requires a high degree of concentration in
the market in which reciprocity-induced sales will occur. A determination of the usefulness of the ConsolidatedFoods argument in combatting
conglomerate insurance mergers requires analysis of both these questions.
The first question, whether proof of past reciprocity practices is
necessary, has assumed ever greater importance as corporate officers,
becoming aware of the antitrust implications of reciprocal dealings,
have adopted more subtle methods which are difficult to detect. 08 The
104. Id. at 594.
105. Id. at 598-99.
106. Id. The Court also stated that the decision did not go so far as to say that any
acquisition, however small, which creates the probability of reciprocal dealing violates
Section 7, since "[slome situations may amount only to de minimis." In the instant
case, however, Gentry had a substantial share of the market, so the Court thought a
finding of illegality was justified. Id. at 600.
107. Id. at 598.
108. Compare the overt price fixing schemes in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898), and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 I .271 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899), with the relatively covert activities in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
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answer was suggested in United States v. Ingersoll-RandCo.,10 9 a third
circuit case decided prior to Consolidated Foods. The court there
stated that the mere existence of the opportunity for reciprocity was
sufficient:"10
[T]he possession of the [purchasing] power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated businessmen are quick to see the advantages in securing the good will of the possessor.
However, while the majority in ConsolidatedFoods did not reach the
question because there was evidence of post-merger reciprocity, Justice
Stewart in his concurring opinion indicated a contrary opinion to that
of the court in Ingersoll-Rand:"
Clearly the opportunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to
invalidate a merger under § 7. The Clayton Act was not passed
to outlaw diversification. Yet large scale diversity of industrial
interests almost always presents the possibility of some reciprocal
relationships.
Subsequent lower court decisions seem to have split on the question.
2
In Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,"1
the court took the position that if a merger creates substantial opportunity for reciprocity, then there is a violation of Section 7.113
Three recent district court opinions, United States v. Penick &
Ford;" United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.;" 5 and United
United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260
F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395 (1959), and Morton Salt Co. v. United
States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
109. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
110. Id. at 524.
111. 380 U.S. at 603.
112. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969).
113. White attempted a take-over of Allis Chalmers and the latter filed an action
alleging that the merger would violate Section 7 on several grounds including reciprocity.
White and Allis Chalmers, both equipment manufacturers, were large purchasers of
steel ($42,000,000 and $44,000,000 respectively), and Blaw-Knox, a subsidiary of White,
manufactured steel rolling mills; hence the combined purchasing power in steel, much
larger than any of Baw-Knox's competitors, would present grounds for reciprocity.
The trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction was reversed on three separate
grounds including the opportunity for reciprocal dealing.
114. 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965). Reynolds Tobacco Company sought to acquire
Penick & Ford, Ltd., the fourth largest producer of starch with 12 percent of a market
somewhat evenly divided between 10 firms. In an action for a preliminary injunction,
the government argued that since Penick & Ford sold starch to paper companies and
Reynolds was a major purchaser of paper, the merger created a probability of reciprocity.
Reynolds submitted uncontroverted evidence that it opposed such practices, however,
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States v. International Telephone and Telegraph Co.11 appear to be
contra. In each of the cases the question was whether the government
had shown sufficient probability of a Section 7 violation for a preliminary injunction to issue. In each case the defendants introduced
evidence which tended to show that the corporations involved had
implemented policies prohibiting reciprocal dealing; in each case the
courts viewed an established corporate policy against reciprocal dealing as a valid defense.
In the ITT-Hartford case, the court distinguished the Allis Chalmers
decision, since no evidence of lack of reciprocity practices was introduced there, and in effect held that a merger creating an opportunity
for reciprocity would not violate Section 7 if there were an affirmative
showing that reciprocity was not likely to be practiced. Arguably, however, an affirmative defense based upon proof of the acquiring corporation's intent not to engage in reciprocal dealing should be given
little weight. Mergers tend to be irrevocable once consummated, but
corporate officers and policies change from time to time; even if the
management is sincere in rejecting reciprocity, there is no assurance
that their successors will be. Moreover, the defense threatens the
whole policy of preventing reciprocal dealing through Section 7 as
corporations become more sophisticated and covert about the matter.

and had instructed its purchasing agents to buy on the basis of price and quality. When
this was combined with the low market share of Penick & Ford the Court did not think
that there was a probability of reciprocity, and hence denied a preliminary injunction.
115. 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The government filed an action for a preliminary injunction when Northwest Industries sought to acquire B.F. Goodrich. The
government argued that the merger would present a substantially increased opportunity
for reciprocal dealing in various respects, an assertion with which the court agreed, and
the government introduced evidence showing past reciprocity practices by both corporations. Northwest, however, introduced evidence showing a policy against such practices,
and the court denied a preliminary injunction because it could not forecast the extent
to which reciprocity would be practiced, although the opportunity clearly existed.
116. 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (hereinafter cited as ITT-Hartford).
This is the leading conglomerate insurance merger case and is currently in litigation
on the merits. The government sought to enjoin ITT from acquiring Grinell Corp., a
manufacturer of automatic sprinkler systems, and Hartford Fire Insurance, the sixth
largest property and liability insurance company. The government argued that the
Hartford merger would present opportunities for reciprocal dealing since ITT's suppliers
were major purchasers of insurance. The court did not feel the reciprocal dealing claim
justified the entry of an injunction, although it did order that the assets be held
separate pending the trial on the merits. The evidence indicated that there were a number
of factors which caused the relationship between insurer and insured to be long-term
where large scale insurance programs were involved. Additionally, the evidence indicated
that ITT had established a clear policy opposing reciprocal dealing, and that its organization was not conducive to it.
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If the documented history of price fixing is any guide, the practice
will remain because it is profitable; but it will exist in the form of tacit
understandings alongside an expressed corporate policy to the contrary.1 17 Section 7 is designed to halt anti-competitive trends in their
incipiency; so, although the ITT-Hartford holding appears to reflect
the currently emerging rule with which most of the cases are consistent,
it is clear that the question is far from resolved."'
The Consolidated Foods decision also leaves open the question of
the degree of concentration necessary, in the market in which the
reciprocity-induced sales are made, to bring its holding into play. The
Court in Penick & Ford thought that the decision in Consolidated
Foods depended upon the existence of a high degree of market concentration in the acquired firm's industry. Gentry was one of two dominant firms in the garlic and onion market which constituted a virtual
duopoly. The Penick & Ford court reasoned that, while reciprocal
practices would be apt to substantially reduce competition in such a
market structure, it was unlikely that this would occur in the relatively
unconcentrated starch market.
The Penick & Ford court, however, was dealing with the potential
entrenchment or increase of a 12 percent market share in an industry
of ten approximately equal-sized firms,"' and it is difficult to see why
they viewed this as an insubstantial threat to competition. One of the
purposes of Section 7 is to prevent the formation of an oligopoly, and
the starch industry was very close to that economic state. Under the
Penick & Ford rationale the ConsolidatedFoods doctrine could come
into play only when an oligopoly already existed-an absurd result.
The court adopted a different approach in the Allis Chalmers case,
where all of the arguments against that primarily conglomerate merger
were directed at preventing entrenchment of already significant market
power; market share analysis was viewed as relatively -unimportant.
This appears to be the better view, especially in regard to the reciproc117. See note 108, supra.
118. Note that the Allis Chalmers and Ingersoll-Rand cases did not involve affirmative
proof that the acquiring corporation had a firm policy against reciprocity. In Northwest
Industries, Penick & Ford and ITT-Hartford there was such evidence. Additionally, it

should be noted that the last three cases were preliminary injunction cases where the
government must meet a high degree of proof in relatively short order, a factor which was
significant in all three.
119. See note 114, supra.
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ity arguments; the Supreme Court in Consolidated Foods was not
primarily concerned with the effects of the reciprocity practices on
concentration, but rather found the practice itself anti-competitive,
since it insulated a portion of the market from competition. Section 7
was applied to prohibit a market structure conducive to such practices.
Perhaps the most rational analysis of the ConsolidatedFoods decision calls for a determination of the portion of the market which could
potentially be governed by reciprocal practices rather than competition
and for a further determination if that portion is substantial. These
findings would probably hinge on: (1) the percentage of the acquired
firm's sales made to the parent's suppliers, (2) the market share of the
acquired firm, and (3) the relative position of the acquired firm in
the market.
The existing authority provides no clear-cut answer to either of the
unresolved questions in the Consolidated Foods decision, but if the
more reasonable positions prevail, all that needs to be shown is that
the merger creates substantial opportunity for reciprocal practices,
and under this interpretation many conglomerate insurance mergers
could be reached.
As mentioned previously, conglomerate insurance mergers present
opportunities for two kinds of reciprocal dealing: the buying power
of the parent or affiliates may be used to enhance the sales of insurance,
and the "selling powers" of credit may be used to enhance the parent's
and affiliates' sales. The government relied primarily upon the latter
possibility in their argument against the ITT-Hartford merger, but
the decision on the preliminary injunction indicates that the argument
may have limited utility when applied to the sales of insurance. Essentially, the court did not believe that the type of insurance there involved lent itself to reciprocal dealing; the court noted that suppliers
of ITT would normally be quite large in absolute terms, and the property/liability insurance policies covering the businesses are typically
quite complicated. There was evidence that insurance companies were
unwilling to incur substantial start-up costs unless it was probable that
the policy would remain outstanding for a substantial period of time,
so that a company with a reputation for changing insurers would find
coverage difficult to obtain. Moreover, provisions for building up an
accounts surplus during periods of low claims to apply toward future
premiums provide incentive for an insured to maintain long-term rela-
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tionships with insurers, and the court found such long-term relationships to be, in fact, the prevailing pattern. 20
The efficacy of the court's conclusions in the ITT-Hartford case
must await completion of the litigation; but if, in the more exhaustive
trial, those conclusions are supported by the weight of evidence, it
appears that practical considerations will generally negate any opportunity to use reciprocity to enhance sales of insurance and that the
courts can consequently be expected to find little basis in the argument
to support a charge of violation of Section 7.
The possibility that the merger would present opportunities for the
insurance company to condition loans on purchases from the parent
and affiliates, however, may provide a stronger case under Section 7.
While the predominant reciprocity pattern involves the use of purchasing power as a lever because the seller desires to sell much worse
than the buyer wants to buy, the opposite situation normally prevails
in the credit market, particularly during a money shortage when
numerous potential buyers require large sums. The insurer's ability
to induce the potential debtor to buy is the critical factor, and if the
power exists there is little reason to believe that the Consolidated
Foods doctrine would not apply. It is probable that many lenders do
have such power.' 2 '
Consequently, it seems possible, under the more reasonable view of
the Consolidated Foods rule, that the possibility of the latter form of
reciprocity would be effective to bar some conglomerate insurance
mergers. The question of power would be pivotal, of course, but if a
conglomerate acquires an insurer there should be little problem in
finding a market where the effects of reciprocal buying would be more
than de minimis. Moreover, even if the Penick & Ford requirement
of extreme concentration is adopted, it might remain possible to find
an affected market which meets that standard. More probably, however, the argument would focus around the portion of the affected
markets which might be potentially isolated from competition rather
120. 306 F. Supp. at 788. During periods of low claims the insured would build up
a surplus on account which, according to the court, was beneficial in making the insurer
tolerate periods of high claim and also in securing lower premium rates upon renegotiation
of the contract.
121. An exhaustive investigation would be necessary to determine the probable extent
of that power and the markets of the parents and afftliates in which it could be most
effectively used to enhance sales.
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than upon the degree of concentration. This determination, like that
of power, would depend upon the particular facts of a case revealed
by intensive investigation.
It must be recognized, however, that the application of the rule will
be severely limited if, as was the case in Penick & Ford,ITT-Hartford,
and Northwest Industries, a finding that the acquiring corporation
has a policy against reciprocity is held to be a valid defense. The outcome of the debate over that defense cannot be predicted yet, but it is
hoped that the reciprocity argument will not be so emasculated.
CONCLUSION
Conglomerate insurance mergers produce economic consequences
which are detrimental in at least two respects. First, the immense
assets of an insurance corporation give the acquiring firm and its
subsidiaries a great deal of economic power which could have adverse
competitive consequences if used aggressively. Second, the conglomerate insurance merger trend, if accelerated, poses a threat that a major
portion of the credit market will lose its economic independence and
cease to treat all borrowers on an equal basis. The result, if ever
reached, would have a substantially adverse impact on the allocation
of economic resources.
It is relatively clear that the McCarran-Ferguson Act presents no
major obstacle to anti-trust suits attacking such mergers, since that
act now leaves only the policyholder-insurer relationship to exclusive
state regulation, and since the jurisdiction prerequisite to state regulation is not likely to be present.
It is presently more difficult to say whether an attack on such mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act would be successful. It now
seems clear that principles covering vertical mergers and transferal
of market power will not reach such mergers unless significantly extended, although in both cases such an extension would be excellent
policy and accordingly seems possible. The best theory of illegality
would be the opportunities for reciprocity created by the merger, as
the existing principles are subject to a relatively straightforward application to conglomerate insurance mergers. However, even the reciprocity arguments may fail if the Penick & Ford requirement of extreme concentration in the affected market is followed, if it can be affir-
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matively shown that the acquiring corporation has a clear policy
against such dealing, or if it is held necessary to show past reciprocity
practices.
Although it is currently uncertain whether Section 7 will reach conglomerate insurance mergers, that result seems necessary in view of
the adverse economic consequences such mergers may cause.
Roland W. Johnson*
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